Learning
Mistake Library
The archive of the most common mistakes, with the typical consequence and a link to the page explaining how to avoid them.
Educational use. This view supports study, familiarisation and preparation. It does not certify competence or compliance and does not replace the SMS, approved procedures or documents, authority decisions, or verification of current sources. If content differs, the linked topic governs.
| Topic | Mistake | Typical consequence | |
|---|---|---|---|
| TMSA: the Company's self-assessment, not the ship's | Levels declared before the evidence is collected | Visible gap between TMSA and SIRE reports for the same fleet | View page → |
| CDI-M: the Ship Inspection Report for chemical tankers, gas carriers and beyond | Preparing on the Chapter 5 of the wrong vessel type | Observations in an area believed to be covered | View page → |
| IOPP Certificate: the Supplement is the document that matters | Equipment replaced without the Supplement being re-endorsed | Deficiency: the certificate does not describe the ship | View page → |
| Oil Record Book | Operation not signed by the officer in charge, or completed page not signed by the Master | PSC deficiency; the measure depends on severity, evidence and applicable criteria | View page → |
| Sludge Management | Sludge balance with an unexplained discrepancy | Suspicion of illegal discharge | View page → |
| Bilge Water | Manual bypass of the OWS alarm system | Environmental offence, detention | View page → |
| Garbage Record Book | Garbage Management Plan missing on a ship of at least 100 GT, a ship certified to carry at least 15 persons, or a fixed/floating platform | Deficiency where one of the MARPOL V/10 thresholds or categories applies | View page → |
| Incinerator | Incineration in port treated as an Annex VI violation | People look in MARPOL for a prohibition that is not there, and lose sight of the port's or coastal State's own rules, which are the source of the actual penalties | View page → |
| Ballast Water | Using the old BWRB format after 1 February 2025 | PSC deficiency | View page → |
| Fuel Changeover | Changeover started too late relative to the ECA boundary | Annex VI deficiency | View page → |
| MARPOL Annex VI | Voyage planning not updated with the ECA designation date used as the fuel obligation date (Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea: designated 1 March 2026, SOx/PM limits 1 March 2027) | Use of non-compliant fuel in an area now regulated as a SECA | View page → |
| Non Conformity | NC closed without verifying the effectiveness of the corrective action | The root cause remains and the NC recurs | View page → |
| Near Miss | Punitive culture towards those who report | The reporting rate collapses and useful information is lost | View page → |
| Fire Drill | Drill run as a simple announcement, without practical use of the equipment | Crew unprepared for a real emergency | View page → |
| ECDIS | Anti-grounding alarms disabled to reduce false alarms | Loss of ECDIS's main safety function | View page → |
| Familiarisation before duties | New crew member assigned duties before immediate familiarisation with applicable functions and procedures | Insufficient preparation before assuming duties | View page → |
| SOLAS III/19.4.1 onboard training | Personnel with applicable duties not trained in the use of life-saving appliances within two weeks of joining | Deficiency and response capability not demonstrated; PSC action is context-dependent | View page → |
| Deficiency Management | Deficiency rectified but not linked to the SMS NC/CAPA system | The root cause remains unresolved, risk of recurrence | View page → |
| Communicating with the Port State Control Officer (PSCO) | Prepared, uniform answers from the whole crew, perceived as insincere | The PSCO extends the inspection beyond what was expected | View page → |
| Enclosed Space Entry | Entry without an instrumental atmosphere test | Real risk of death, among the most severe on board | View page → |
| COLREG | Crossing a TSS at an angle not close to 90° | Risk of collision with lane traffic | View page → |
| Bridge Resource Management | No check that the team shares the same mental model of the situation | Decisions made on different information bases among team members | View page → |
| Planned Maintenance System | Standby equipment not tested because it is 'not in use' | A failure of the primary unit reveals that the standby unit doesn't work either | View page → |
| Tail Shaft Survey | Continuous monitoring (CMS) data collected but not systematically analysed | Deterioration trend not detected in time | View page → |
| HSSC | Intermediate Survey planned as if it had the same window as the Annual Survey, i.e. ±3 months around every anniversary date | Survey placed outside its window: the Intermediate window is ±3 months around the second or the third anniversary date (SOLAS I/10(a)(iii)) | View page → |
| EEXI/EPL | Exclusive reliance on EPL without considering the operational impact on maximum available speed | Reduced commercial flexibility of the ship not fully assessed in advance | View page → |
| Sewage Management | Discharge of untreated sewage with an imprecise estimate of distance from the coast | Violation of Regulation 11, possible deficiency or legal action by the coastal State | View page → |
| Bunker Delivery Note | MARPOL sample not taken, or taken without a traceable procedure | Unable to prove fuel compliance in a subsequent check | View page → |
| MLC Complaint Handling | Complaint procedure not clearly explained to the seafarer on joining | MLC deficiency in a PSC inspection | View page → |
| Permit to Work | Hot work permit renewed without a new atmosphere test if the work extends beyond the initial validity | Risk conditions not updated, possible accident with an atmosphere that has changed in the meantime | View page → |
| Ship Security Plan/ISPS | The ship’s ISSC/Interim ISSC confused with the Ship Security Officer’s competence or national qualification document | Clear grounds for a detailed security inspection with a Duly Authorized Officer, and possible detention among the control measures decided | View page → |
| Liferaft/EPIRB | Annual liferaft servicing exceeded without Administration extension, which may reach 17 months only where the 12-month interval is impracticable | Serious deficiency, possible detention | View page → |
| USCG Port State Control | Assumption that Paris/Tokyo MOU compliance is enough for US calls too | Unpleasant surprise when facing USCG-specific, non-harmonised requirements | View page → |
| Tokyo MOU | Underestimating the relevance of BWMS functioning ahead of inspections in the Asia-Pacific region | Deficiency in the category most frequently found in recent campaigns | View page → |
| Ro-Ro Cargo Securing | Standard number of lashing points applied without considering the vehicle's actual centre of gravity | Insufficient lashing for vehicles with a high centre of gravity | View page → |
| Reefer Container Monitoring | Daily temperature checks recorded generically, without a time stamp | Inability to demonstrate the real extent of a deviation in case of a dispute | View page → |
| Cargo Claim Handling | No reservation noted on the bill of lading despite non-compliant conditions at loading | Presumption of carrier liability for pre-existing damage | View page → |
| Polar Waters Passage Planning | Voyage plan for polar waters reusing the standard passage planning approach | Failure to consider ice, SAR capability and places of refuge | View page → |
| GNSS Resilience | Exclusive reliance on GNSS position without cross-checking in areas of known risk | Use of a spoofed position without timely detection | View page → |
| VTS Traffic Management | VTS guidance perceived as binding orders rather than information/assistance | Suboptimal navigational decisions without the Master's full critical assessment | View page → |
| Boiler Operations | Safety device checks limited to a visual inspection, without testing under operating conditions | Safety valve malfunction not detected until a critical event | View page → |
| Refrigeration Plant | No advance planning for the transition to low-GWP refrigerants | Supply difficulties as regulatory deadlines approach | View page → |
| Engine Room Energy Efficiency | Engine performance deterioration attributed generically to 'wear' without checking hull/propeller fouling | Hull cleaning not scheduled in time, growing impact on consumption | View page → |
| Anchor Chain Cable Survey | Only the most visibly worn links renewed instead of the whole affected length | Non-compliance with the length-based renewal rule | View page → |
| Cargo Hold Survey Bulk Carrier | Coating condition assessed as 'POOR' but not logged or re-examined at the Annual Survey | Non-compliance with IACS UR Z11 rev.7 | View page → |
| Shipyard Waste Management | Blasting residue containing organotin compounds treated as generic shipyard waste | Risk of environmental contamination of the shipyard site | View page → |
| Safety Construction/Equipment/Radio | Anniversary dates of the three certificates not synchronised under the HSSC cycle | Unnecessary back-to-back surveys and risk of a missed deadline | View page → |
| ISPS Certification | ISSC intermediate audit scheduled right up against the deadline of the window between the 2nd and 3rd anniversary | Risk of missing the required window | View page → |
| MLC Certification | DMLC Part II not updated following changes to onboard procedures | Discrepancy found during inspection between the declared document and actual practice | View page → |
| BWM Convention In Depth | BWMS commissioning test documentation not systematically kept on board | Unable to demonstrate actual operational compliance if checked | View page → |
| Biofouling Management | In-water cleaning performed by services without a containment and capture system for residues | Release of invasive organisms and antifouling paint residues into the environment | View page → |
| Underwater Radiated Noise | Propeller cavitation not monitored as a primary source of underwater noise | Failure to identify an easily correctable cause | View page → |
| Anti-Fouling Systems | Cybutryne removal postponed beyond the 60-month limit since last application | Non-compliance with the maximum deadline set by the 2021 amendments | View page → |
| VOC Management Plan | Crew not specifically trained on VOC procedures, confused with general cargo procedures | Incomplete application of emission-minimisation measures | View page → |
| Management of Change | Changes implemented informally without a structured assessment process | Risks associated with the change not identified before implementation | View page → |
| Dangerous Goods Manifest | Manifest not updated after changes to the actual stowage plan | Wrong information on the location of dangerous goods in an emergency | View page → |
| Lithium Batteries | Battery fire handled with conventional firefighting techniques | Ineffective extinguishing and risk of reignition | View page → |
| IMDG Training | Generic training for the whole crew without distinguishing the three required levels | Personnel with direct responsibilities not adequately prepared | View page → |
| Watertight Doors | Watertight doors kept open while underway for ease of passage | Watertight subdivision defeated in the event of a sudden breach | View page → |
| Helicopter Operations | Refuelling carried out without dedicated firefighting personnel present | Critical response time lost in the event of ignition during refuelling | View page → |
| Black Sea MOU | Preparation based only on Paris MoU statistics, without considering regional specifics | Underestimation of the real inspection/detention risk in the region | View page → |
| Indian Ocean MOU | Breadth and variety of member states underestimated in voyage planning | Calls at member states of the regime not recognized as such | View page → |
| Heavy Lift Cargo | Standard CSS lashing tables applied by analogy to a non-standardised cargo | Underestimation of the actual forces acting on the cargo and insufficient lashing | View page → |
| BNWAS | BNWAS treated as a mechanical formality, with automatic or near-automatic resets without genuine verification of alertness | The system loses its function of genuinely verifying the officer's active presence | View page → |
| IoT Predictive Maintenance | Sensors installed but data collected without systematic trend analysis | Impending failure not anticipated despite the instrumentation being available | View page → |
| Boiler Water Treatment | Boiler water tests carried out occasionally instead of with a systematic daily frequency | TDS or pH drift not detected in time, with risk of scale or foaming | View page → |
| Shipyard Repair Contracts | Generic repair specification developed without a detailed analysis of the ship's actual condition | Additional work negotiated under unfavourable contractual conditions during execution | View page → |
| Multi-Class Survey | Bilateral Agreement between the two Classification Societies not checked before planning the survey cycle | Duplicated surveys or coverage gaps between the two class societies | View page → |
| Statement of Compliance for Temporary Lay-up | Essential checks neglected during lay-up on the assumption the ship is 'non-operational' and therefore low risk | Undetected deterioration that lengthens the reactivation survey | View page → |
| Digital Statutory Certificates | Electronic certificate treated as a simple PDF scan, without the required technical safeguards | The document is not recognized as the legal equivalent of the paper certificate | View page → |
| Onboard Carbon Capture and Storage | Investment in an OCCS system based on the expectation of an immediate EEXI or CII credit | Regulatory expectations disappointed, since the credit is not yet recognized | View page → |
| Shore Power and Cold Ironing | Port call planning based only on the regulatory obligation, without checking actual OPS infrastructure availability | Unable to connect to OPS despite the obligation | View page → |
| Wind-Assisted Propulsion Systems | WAPS technology chosen without assessing the wind conditions of the actual operating routes | Actual fuel savings significantly below expectations | View page → |
| Solid Bulk Dangerous Cargoes (IMSBC) | Shipper's moisture content certificate accepted without independent verification in case of doubt | Cargo with moisture above the TML loaded without the risk being detected | View page → |
| MARPOL Annex III | 'MARINE POLLUTANT' marking not applied because deemed redundant with the primary IMDG class labelling | Non-compliance with MARPOL Annex III even when the IMDG safety classification is correct | View page → |
| Polar Waters Discharges | Only the standard MARPOL rules applied during a polar waters transit, without considering Polar Code Part II-A | Discharge non-compliant with the stricter restrictions specifically applicable in polar waters | View page → |
| Contractor Management | Supplier/contractor engaged without a documented, verifiable qualification procedure | Major non-conformity in an audit when evidence of qualification is requested | View page → |
| Whistleblowing | Whistleblowing channel not kept distinct from ordinary reporting channels | The reporter does not perceive a safe alternative when ordinary channels are inadequate | View page → |
| Immersion Suits | Immersion suits counted from the number of lifeboats on a cargo ship, where the criterion is per person | Fewer suits than persons embarked, with the shortfall never showing up in any count | View page → |
| Fixed CO2/Water Mist Firefighting Systems | Believing that a fixed system requires a recharge stock equal to 100% of the charges | Purchase and stowage of a reserve that no regulation requires, and false confidence about a “second intervention” | View page → |
| Escape Routes | Category A machinery space escape routes checked only for their formal existence, without verifying true independence | Both escape routes potentially compromised by the same event | View page → |
| Appeal Against a Detention | Correcting deficiencies postponed pending the outcome of the appeal | Unnecessarily prolonged ship detention, since the detention is not suspended during the appeal | View page → |
| Flag State-PSC Coordination | SSO certificate validity not systematically checked before a security inspection | Clear ground under Appendix 20 of the 2025 PSC procedures: the Duly Authorized Officer is involved and decides the control measures, detention included | View page → |
| Break Bulk Cargo | Over-stowage of the cargo, with accumulated weight that the lower layer cannot support | Damage to the cargo in the lower layer during transport | View page → |
| Charter Party and Cargo Clauses | Port or berth nominated by the charterer accepted without verification against the safe port/safe berth clause | Exposure of the ship to a port or berth that is unsafe under the contractual terms | View page → |
| Icebreaker Convoy Navigation | Safe distance from the icebreaker set independently instead of following convoy command instructions | Risk of collision with re-formed ice or other convoy vessels | View page → |
| ECDIS Datum Shift and Chart Reference | GPS position shown by the ECDIS trusted without checking the cell's datum notes | Positional error not detected in areas with an unknown or unreliable WGS84 conversion | View page → |
| Integrated Automation and UMS | UMS regime kept active despite a critical alarm flagged as unverifiable | Loss of the equivalent safety required by SOLAS II-1 Part E without anyone noticing until a real event | View page → |
| Engine Room Digital Twin | Investment in a digital twin platform without a sufficiently mature sensor infrastructure | Simulation model fed by insufficient data, with unreliable predictions | View page → |
| Post-Repair Warranties | Warranty claim notified after the contractual deadlines | Claim rejected regardless of the technical merit of the defect | View page → |
| Sister-Ship Dry Dock Planning | Each ship in the series treated as an isolated case, without reusing lessons learned from the previous cycle | Known recurring issues on the series rediscovered from scratch at every dry dock cycle | View page → |
| Interim Certificates | Planning for the definitive certificate's audit/survey started too late relative to the interim's expiry | Real risk of the interim certificate expiring before the definitive one is ready | View page → |
| Class-Statutory Survey Coordination | Class and statutory surveys planned separately despite falling within the same HSSC window | Doubled operational disruption and extra cost for two separate surveyor visits | View page → |
| Methanol/Ammonia Bunkering | Planning based on theoretical technical compatibility, without checking actual bunkering availability along the routes | Practically unable to refuel the ship according to the original voyage plan | View page → |
| Just Transition and Decarbonization | Crew training on alternative fuels planned only right before the new ship's delivery | Crew unprepared for the ship entering service, with real operational risk | View page → |
| EU MRV Review | Scope of the MRV Regulation checked only once and never updated over time | A ship that falls into a recently included category without the Company noticing | View page → |
| IMO DCS Transport Work | Data collection systems upgrade postponed, relying only on the mandatory 2026 deadline | Systems not ready in time, risk of non-compliance at the deadline | View page → |
| Prevention of Violence and Harassment | PSSR training renewed without checking that it includes the new competency required from 2026 | Certification formally completed but not compliant with the new STCW requirements | View page → |
| Master's Authority | The Master's overriding authority documented in the SMS but not concretely upheld when it carries a commercial cost | Erosion of the Master's trust in the system | View page → |
| Ro-Ro and Vehicle Spaces | Keel-laying date not checked to determine the applicability of the new 2026 requirements | Detection system design not compliant with the applicable requirements | View page → |
| SOLAS II-1/3-13 Lifting Appliances | Cargo cranes left out of the survey, on the view that Regulation II-1/3-13 covers only non-commercial appliances | The appliances of greatest capacity and greatest accident record — the very reason the regulation was adopted — are left out: non-conformity found at SAFCON renewal | View page → |
| Mediterranean MOU | Paris MoU statistics and priorities applied uncritically to calls in the Med MoU region | Preparation not calibrated to the real regional specifics | View page → |
| Bulk Carrier PSC | PSC preparation focused only on the structural/ESP component, neglecting ISM and maintenance | Detention for the deficiency categories that remain the most frequent in the segment | View page → |
| BLU Code | Ship/shore information exchange form completed as a documentary formality, without verifying its actual application during operations | The loading sequence actually applied differs from the one agreed, with structural risk | View page → |
| Containers Lost at Sea | Container loss reported only internally to the Company, without notification to nearby ships, the coastal State and the flag State | Non-compliance with the new SOLAS Chapter V requirement from 2026, an unaddressed risk for other ships | View page → |
| Cargo Record Book (Record Book for Noxious Liquid Substances) | Category X prewash not carried out, or not compliant with the ship's specific P&A Manual | Serious violation of MARPOL Annex II, a high-severity environmental deficiency | View page → |
| Cargo Securing Manual and Cargo Lashing | Cargo Securing Manual not updated after changes to the securing equipment | The manual no longer reflects the ship's actual securing capacity | View page → |
| Draft Survey and Determining Cargo Quantity | Imprecise draught readings, or readings taken by untrained personnel | A systematic error that propagates through the entire displacement calculation | View page → |
| IMDG Code — Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Packaged Form | Inconsistent use of different editions of the IMDG Code for the same shipment during the transitional period | Documentary inconsistency, possible deficiency | View page → |
| Loading/Discharging Plan | Plan agreed only for the final state, not for the intermediate stages | Excessive structural stresses during the operation, even with a compliant final state | View page → |
| Tank Cleaning | Generic washing procedure applied instead of the specific one in the P&A Manual | Residues not adequately removed, risk of contamination | View page → |
| STCW Simulator Training | Certification paths planned around a sea service/simulator substitution not yet in force | Certification path non-compliant with the STCW requirements currently applicable | View page → |
| MASS Code | MASS Code assumed to already be binding on all autonomous ships from 2026 | Incorrect regulatory planning relative to the actual legal status | View page → |
| Methanol Engines | Spare parts for methanol engines managed with the same logistics as conventional or LNG engines | Delays in the availability of critical specific spares, with prolonged machinery downtime | View page → |
| BESS Battery Rooms | Battery room treated as a generic extension of the engine room in the emergency plan | Inadequate response strategy in the event of thermal runaway | View page → |
| Hong Kong Convention IHM | IHM Part I treated as a document to prepare only close to final recycling | Difficult and imprecise retroactive reconstruction of the hazardous materials history | View page → |
| Next-Generation Coatings | Coating choice based only on immediate application cost, without considering the total life-cycle | Higher total life-cycle cost, more frequent dry dockings than necessary | View page → |
| Shipyard Hot Work Permit | Ship and shipyard permit systems not formally aligned before hot work begins | Confusion over responsibility and level of control, risk of safety gaps | View page → |
| Flag Change | Flag change completed without ensuring continuity of statutory certificate validity | Documentary gap period in which the ship operates without fully valid certificates | View page → |
| HSSC-Vetting Coordination | HSSC calendar and vetting inspection calendar managed separately without being shared | Unintended concentration of surveys and vetting inspections in the same time window | View page → |
| CII Reduction Factors | Revised SEEMP Part II not ready in time for the 1 January 2026 deadline | Documentary non-compliance with the new CII requirements | View page → |
| Alternative Fuels and Operational Readiness | Crew trained generically on 'alternative fuels' instead of specifically on the fuel actually used | Personnel not adequately prepared for the specific risks of the actual fuel on board | View page → |
| CII (Carbon Intensity Indicator) | CII rating monitored only at year-end, without intra-year projections | Late discovery of an insufficient rating, with no time for corrective action within the current year | View page → |
| EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime | EU ETS and FuelEU Maritime treated as a single obligation, without distinguishing their logic | Confusion in managing the obligations, which are actually distinct mechanisms with their own deadlines and logic | View page → |
| SEEMP Part II and Part III | SEEMP Part II not updated per the greater data granularity required from 1 August 2025 | Data collected not compliant with the new requirements, CII reporting at risk of inaccuracy | View page → |
| Environmental Vetting and GHG Rating | GHG Rating monitored only at the time of a commercial fixture, not proactively | Late discovery of an insufficient rating for an expected nomination | View page → |
| Class 7 Radioactive Materials | Approval sought from the coastal States crossed in transit, which cannot issue it | Time spent on requests no regulation provides for, while the prior notifications owed to port States go uncovered | View page → |
| General Cargo Dangerous Goods | Segregation categories applied without considering the absence of a container's physical enclosure | Physically insufficient segregation distance in the hold | View page → |
| CTU Code: Packing and Stowage of Cargo Transport Units | CTU filled without a prior check of the structural integrity of the unit | Risk of loss of tightness or structural failure during transport | View page → |
| EmS Guide and MFAG: Responding to Emergencies Involving Dangerous Goods | EmS Guide or MFAG on board in an edition not consistent with the IMDG edition applied to the cargo | Absence of emergency procedures for the new entries introduced by the latest amendment | View page → |
| IBC Code and Operations on Chemical Tankers | Cargo accepted without an explicit check of the ship-specific Certificate of Fitness | Carriage of a product not permitted for the ship type or the intended tank | View page → |
| Liquefied Gases and Operational Notes on the IGC Code | Tank cooldown carried out too quickly relative to the prescribed cooling curve | Risk of thermal shock and structural damage to the containment system | View page → |
| Safe Return to Port | Treating SRtP system redundancy as purely a design feature, without verifying its operational upkeep over time | Progressive degradation of the actual return-to-port capability compared with what was foreseen at the design stage | View page → |
| Passenger Musters | Old muster rule of 'within 24 hours of departure' applied, superseded since 2015 | Non-compliance with SOLAS III/19, passengers without instructions for a leg of the voyage | View page → |
| Ro-Ro Passenger Damage Stability | Operating limits of one sister ship applied assuming the same stability regime | Actual operating limits of the ship exceeded, reduced safety margin | View page → |
| Gastrointestinal Outbreak | Waiting until the 3% threshold is reached before stepping up cleaning and surveillance | Failure to prevent progression to a formal outbreak | View page → |
| SAR Cooperation Plan | SAR cooperation plan developed once and never updated again | Plan no longer consistent with the actual operating area or available SAR services | View page → |
| Persons with Reduced Mobility | Accessibility requirements considered limited to the physical dimension only, ignoring the EAA's digital scope | Ticketing/information systems non-compliant with requirements binding since 2025 | View page → |
| Evacuation Analysis | Simplified method used for complex ship configurations where its assumptions no longer hold | Evacuation analysis not representative of real emergency behaviour | View page → |
| Passenger Ship Safety Certificate | Annual PSSC survey planned last-minute, without integration into the general operating calendar | Operational pressure and risk of impact on scheduled passenger service | View page → |
| Gangway Operations | Access ladder used without checking that the actual angle is within the indicated maximum/minimum limits | Structural stress not anticipated by the design, risk of failure | View page → |
| Tender Operations | Lifejackets left stowed during tendering without a documented risk assessment | Operating practice with no documentary basis, indefensible in the event of an incident | View page → |
| Passenger Accounting | Counting of those present at muster stations left to individual initiative, without a written procedure | As in the Costa Concordia case, unable to establish who is present or missing | View page → |
| Crowd Management | Drills conducted only with linear routes and cooperative passengers, without panic scenarios | Crew unprepared for real passenger behaviour in an emergency | View page → |
| Cabin Safety (CVSSA) | CVSSA cabin compliance checked only generically, without verifying the exact technical specifications | Technical non-compliance detectable in a targeted USCG inspection | View page → |
| Medical Centre | Medical centre's clinical operating standards not aligned with the industry's reference ACEP guidelines | Medical centre below the standard the industry effectively expects | View page → |
| Turnaround Operations | No Simultaneous Operations Leader designated to coordinate conflicting turnaround activities | Coordination responsibility diffused, impacts not managed promptly | View page → |
| North-East Atlantic ECA | Passage planning and chart updates postponed close to the entry-into-force date (1 September 2027) | Risk of sailing in the new ECA without properly planned changeover procedures | View page → |
| Integrated Bilge Water Treatment System | IBTS treated as a replacement for the 15 ppm separator | Inadequate handling of anomalies or alarms specific to the integrated system | View page → |
| Marine Plastic Strategy and Pellet Code | The pellet recommendations treated as industry practice, without knowing they are an IMO circular with a number and a date | In a vetting or a dispute the answer is “internal good practice” instead of a citation of MEPC.1/Circ.909 of 19 April 2024 | View page → |
| NOx Technical Code: Certification of Ammonia and Multi-Fuel Engines (MEPC 84) | Treating “the NOx Technical Code amendments” as a single block still awaiting adoption, because the ammonia ones are | MEPC.398(83) drops out of view: in force from 1 September 2026, it covers every engine subject to substantial modification or recertified to a different Tier — that is, engines already on board, not just newbuildings | View page → |
| New 2026 ECAs: Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea | The two new ECAs (Canadian Arctic and Norwegian Sea) confused with the future North-East Atlantic ECA, treating them as a single 2027 deadline | Non-compliant navigation in Arctic/Norwegian waters as early as 2026-2027, wrongly believing the deadline is single and further away | View page → |
| SOPEP — Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan | Emergency contacts not updated | Delayed notification in a real spill | View page → |
| Crew Fatigue | Rest hour logging treated as a mere documentary formality, without reflecting real fatigue management on board | Formal compliance that fails to prevent chronic fatigue build-up in the crew | View page → |
| Corrective and Preventive Action (CAPA) | Corrective action addressing the symptom, not the root cause | The NC recurs in similar form | View page → |
| Cyber Risk Management in the SMS (MSC.428(98)) | Cyber risk managed as a separate IT matter, not integrated into the SMS's general risk assessment | Lack of integrated documentary evidence in the event of an audit, despite the existence of technical IT measures | View page → |
| Designated Person Ashore (DPA) | DPA appointed only formally, without real access to top management | NC in certification audit, ineffective escalation system in an emergency | View page → |
| Document of Compliance (DOC) and Safety Management Certificate (SMC) | DOC and SMC periodical verifications treated as if they had the same cadence, applying the SMC's intermediate window to the DOC | The Code does not say the certificate lapses by itself: §13.5 provides for withdrawal of the DOC when the annual verification is not requested, §13.9 for withdrawal of the SMC when the intermediate one is not. Both omissions are detainable deficiencies (A.1206(34), App. 2, §5 “Areas under the ISM Code”): item .8 “Evidence of the DOC annual verification is not available on board” and item .4 “The SMC intermediate verification is overdue” | View page → |
| Emergency Preparedness and Contingency Plan | Drill conducted as a simple verbal announcement, without practical use of the equipment | Crew unprepared for the real use of emergency equipment when actually needed | View page → |
| Crew Familiarisation and Training | Familiarization treated as a formality to be signed off, without real knowledge transfer | Crew nominally 'familiarised' but unprepared in a real emergency | View page → |
| Internal SMS Audit | An auditor verifying their own area of responsibility | Loss of independence, NC in external audit | View page → |
| Management Review | Management Review reduced to a completed form without real discussion | NC in certification audit for lack of evidence of genuine top management involvement | View page → |
| Autonomous Ships (MASS): the Company's Responsibility under the SMS | MASS/remote operations introduced without a formal Management of Change in the SMS | Absence of a documented risk assessment specific to the new operating model | View page → |
| Pilot Transfer Arrangements | Newbuildings with delivery from 2028 planned without specifying compliance with the new performance standard to the yard | Equipment compliant only with the old version of Regulation V/23, requiring later upgrade at extra cost | View page → |
| Fuel Safety and Flashpoint | Bunkering started without having received the supplier's signed flashpoint declaration | Non-compliance with the new SOLAS requirement and risk of fuel with an unverified flashpoint on board | View page → |
| Emergency Generator Test | Test limited to the start alone, without verifying the actual load pick-up | Hidden faults only emerge during a real emergency or a thorough inspection | View page → |
| GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress and Safety System) | Onboard documentation still referring exclusively to 'Inmarsat' instead of RMSS | Inconsistency with updated SOLAS terminology, possible PSC requests for clarification | View page → |
| Lifeboat Inspection (Inspection and Maintenance of Life-Saving Boats) | Crew on board during under-load release tests not specifically established as safe | Risk of serious or fatal injury in the event of a hook malfunction | View page → |
| Passage Planning | Passage plan drawn up only for the open-sea route, not berth-to-berth | Critical port manoeuvring phases not adequately planned | View page → |
| Fraudulent Certificates and Registrations | Post-flag-change documentation treated as an administrative formality, without a thorough consistency check across the new certificates | Documentary inconsistencies flagged by the PSCO, triggering extra scrutiny even without a real irregularity | View page → |
| Pre-PSC Checklist | Checklist applied only when an inspection is considered 'likely' | Pre-existing deficiencies remain undetected at port calls perceived as low risk | View page → |
| Concentrated Inspection Campaigns (CIC) | No specific preparation ahead of an announced CIC | A more thorough inspection on the topic catches the crew unprepared | View page → |
| Detention and Banning | Underestimating the impact of a detention on the Ship Risk Profile for the following 36 months | More frequent, more thorough inspections continue well beyond resolution of the episode | View page → |
| Documentation Required on Board | On-board copy of a certificate not updated after a renewal | Deficiency for inconsistent documentation, even though the certificate is substantively valid | View page → |
| Ship Risk Profile and New Inspection Regime (NIR) | No monitoring of the Ship Risk Profile by the Company | Learning the risk level only at the moment of selection for inspection comes as a surprise | View page → |
| VDES and NAVDAT | The 31 December 2026 target read as a shipboard deadline, and multi-RMSS reception treated as an obligation of the ship | People look on board for a compliance no Regulation prescribes (IV/7.1.4 asks only for “a receiver or receivers”), while losing sight of the one real convention date: 1 January 2028 for Regulations IV/5, V/4 and V/5 | View page → |
| Next-Generation ECDIS S-100 | Investment in new ECDIS equipment planned without checking the supplier's S-100 compatibility roadmap | Risk of equipment needing early replacement ahead of its expected life cycle | View page → |
| Anchoring and Anchor Watch | Chain paid out according to a fixed generic rule, without considering forecast weather/sea conditions | Insufficient anchor holding if conditions deteriorate | View page → |
| Pilotage and Under Keel Clearance in Restricted Areas | Cursory or absent Master-Pilot Exchange | The pilot manoeuvres without full awareness of the ship's specific characteristics/limitations | View page → |
| VDR (Voyage Data Recorder) | Annual performance test not carried out or overdue | PSC deficiency, risk that the VDR will not function correctly when needed | View page → |
| Navigation in Restricted Visibility | Applying the rules for vessels in sight of one another (Rules 11-18) to a restricted-visibility situation | Manoeuvre not compliant with Rule 19, risk of collision | View page → |
| Watchkeeping | Bridge left unattended even for a few minutes in traffic or restricted-navigation conditions | Risk of collision or grounding not detected in time | View page → |
| Ammonia Engines | Crew training on alternative fuels treated generically, without distinguishing the specific protocols for ammonia's toxicity | Inadequate response in the event of release or exposure, given the different risk profile | View page → |
| Bunkering Operations and Fuel Quality Control | Pre-bunkering safety checklist completed as a formality without genuine verification of conditions | Spill risk not adequately mitigated | View page → |
| Cyber Risk Management of Automation Systems | OT and IT networks not segmented, with shared access points | A compromise of the IT network (e.g. via email) can propagate to critical control systems | View page → |
| Blackout and Failure Management | No immediate communication to the bridge in the event of a blackout underway | Delayed assessment of navigational risks (drift, proximity to other ships/coast) | View page → |
| Critical Spare Parts Management | Critical spares list not updated after changes to the identified critical equipment | Missing spares for equipment recently classified as critical | View page → |
| Fire Pumps and Fixed Systems in the Engine Room | Emergency pump test conducted using the same power supply as the main engine room | The test does not genuinely verify the emergency condition the pump is designed for | View page → |
| Purifiers and Separators (Fuel Oil / Lube Oil Purifiers) | Purifier setting not updated after a change in fuel quality | Reduced separation effectiveness, risk of machinery damage | View page → |
| Remote Inspection Techniques (RIT) | RIT survey planned using an operator not verified as formally approved by the ship's own Classification Society | Risk that the survey is not recognized as valid for class purposes | View page → |
| Bottom Survey and In-Water Survey (IWS) | EDD/IWS approval request submitted too late relative to the 36-month deadline | Inability to organize the IWS in time, forcing an unplanned dry-docking | View page → |
| Coating and PSPC (Performance Standard for Protective Coatings) | Coating applied under out-of-specification environmental conditions (excessive humidity, unsuitable temperature) | Compromised coating adhesion, premature failure | View page → |
| Dry Dock Entry Planning | Repair specification drafted too late or too generically | Difficulty obtaining comparable quotes and risk of underestimating time | View page → |
| Thickness Measurement (Ultrasonic Thickness Measurement, UTM) | Thickness measurement campaign limited to the minimum extent without considering the ship's actual age | Advanced corrosion areas not detected in time | View page → |
| Survey in Dry Dock | Presence of Class surveyor and flag Administration surveyor not coordinated, with visits on separate dates | Additional waiting time that prolongs the docking period | View page → |
| Rudder and Sea Chests (Sea Chests and Sea Valves) | Rudder clearance measured but not systematically compared with the trend of previous measurements | An abnormal wear rate is not detected promptly | View page → |
| IP Code (Industrial Personnel) | Pre-existing authorisation before 1 July 2024 assumed valid indefinitely, without planning the transition to the IP Code | Authorisation lapses at the next survey without an Industrial Personnel Safety Certificate ready | View page → |
| Annual Survey | Annual Survey treated as a minor formality, prepared with less rigor than the Renewal | Early indications of problems are not detected or addressed promptly | View page → |
| Condition of Class and Recommendations | Condition of Class treated as lower priority than a PSC deficiency or an ISM Non-Conformity | Deadline missed, risk of class suspension | View page → |
| Harmonized System of Survey and Certification (HSSC) | Intermediate Survey window not tracked with the same priority as Renewal | The certificate shall cease to be valid by force of SOLAS regulation I/14(i)(i), and it does so also where the survey was carried out but not endorsed on the certificate (subparagraph (ii)) | View page → |
| International Load Line Certificate | Operating draft exceeding the assigned freeboard for the zone/season | Direct violation of the Convention, reduction of the real safety margin | View page → |
| Remote Survey Guidance: Remote Survey, ISM Audits and ISPS Verifications | Remote verification requested without first confirming that the type falls within the Guidance's scope | Request refused or need to repeat the verification in physical form | View page → |
| Renewal Survey and Certificate Renewal | The 3-month extension used systematically as a planning practice, not as an exception | Reduced safety margin, risk of exceeding even the maximum limit in the event of further delays | View page → |
| Tonnage Certificate and IMO Number | Tonnage Certificate not updated after a structural modification that alters GT/NT | Certificate not representative of the actual configuration, possible implications for applicable regulatory thresholds | View page → |
| IMO Net-Zero Framework | Fleet planning based on the original entry-into-force date without monitoring slippages in the adoption process (the October 2025 session closed without agreement) | Fuel/compliance credit investments calibrated to a regulatory timeline that is no longer current | View page → |
Every operational page has its own recurring-mistakes table: this page carries one row per page and links back to it, where the mistake is covered in full together with the others.